Can India contain China?

Of all the threats, which India faces, the biggest is China. Other threats like Pakistani Army attitude and terrorists are proxy threats. China represents a threat in itself. India and China are two civilizations and a conflict between these two will be a civilizational conflict. Chinese Proxy Pakistan has been engaged by USA for good. Notwithstanding the Pakistani Army macho claims on its successes on Taliban and Taliban controlled areas, is Pakistan Vietnam in making. Wake up call for Pakistan fixated Indian myopic leaders and military generals that its time India looks at containing the real problem: China.

India has no credible strategy in place to contain China. The current Congress leadership is more interested in keeping themselves in power and Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi have better relations with China than what India has. The fact is that, Indians have been living under the shadow of Chinese ballistic missiles positioned in Chinese occupied Tibet (COT) and live a borrowed life. There are no means to protecting ourselves and we have very little options to hurt China in mainland.More than Indian policies, the US policies have helped India to address our foreign policy problems. Former US President Bush had gifted us the nuclear deal and President Obama has tried to impress upon Pakistan that India is no threat. Former US President Bush had also proposed to make India as a counter weight to China. Now, many in India resented this.
We live under the shadows of Chinese nuclear and missile threat. China has supplied nuclear bomb design, nuclear components and missiles among other things to Proxy Pakistan. It has tried to rally our neighbors against us. Contained and created difficulties for us diplomatically in world forums. The list of Chinese mechanisations goes on.

Internally, Nehru-Gandhi family which ruled India for obnoxiously long years have been busy “managing” Indians than foreign threats. It holds true even today. Chinese have played their part well too. They disregard the “other” Indian leadership and court Nehru-Gandhi family. The Indian communists have been Pro China to such an extent that, they look anti-Indian. The Indian military (except navy) has not gone for incremental development and deployment of indigenous equipment compared to what Chinese Forces have done. This has brought us to a foreign dependence. If we buy foreign defence equipment, we experience reliability, legal and diplomatic issues, while Indian military leaders would not allow internal development. The problem has been compounded by the trade unions (mostly Communist controlled) who don’t allow to changes in quality military production set up and the communist want every deal with US and Israel canceled. As for the Indian right wingers go, they have a sound policy on international relations, but, they are communal in outlook and hurt common man with their fascist tendencies.

On China front, India did take some steps militarily. This includes deploying Agni missiles on Chinese border, shifting Su-30 MKI to airfields facing China, sending naval ships to exercise with Japanese and funds for development of border with China to name major initiatives. Nevertheless, India lacks a composite strategy to engage China and whatever strategy exists today is merely reactionary.

Look at India’s private sector. Indian private sector has competed against Chinese government based companies and bettered them. Chinese recognize the strength of Indian private sector. When a Chinese official comes to India, he wants to spend more time with Indian companies after finishing the diplomatic necessities with government. An Indian businessperson is more likely to be given visa in china than an Indian government official.

China will attack India when others are busy and is advantageous for China. Will India ever attack china even when it feels advantageous?

Second question is the location of Chinese threat. Chinese army is deployed on the higher ground and Indian Army is deployed on the lower ground. Chinese disadvantage of moving troops and equipment over the occupied Tibetan is overcome by feats in road construction, railway line and air strips. China also has built up vehicles/ carriers to move around at Tibet border, while Indian Army still depends largely upon mules. Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), other airfields reactivated, current roads building program at Chinese border are meant to “keep an eye” on Chinese and have very less value when it comes to large-scale troop movements. Stationing SU-30 MKI at Chinese borders is the only credible defence on Chinese border, which we have seen lately. Does India have the border infrastructure at Chinese border?Third question is Chinese posses’ long-range artillery, which is not yet employed in decisive manner by India. China has deployed missiles in occupied Tibet and it can hit any part of India it wants. Indian on the other hand has just started building up offensive missile systems, which can harm Chinese at their main land. While Chinese will have no remorse to hit Indian populated centers, Chinese PLA can use Tibetan cities as shields. It is possible that Tibetans will rise in revolt, but it is anybody’s guess if china has not built it into calculation. There are fresh examples of how equipped are the Chinese to contain Tibetans. Indian ABM systems are quite a while away. Will India hurl missiles at Tibetan cities? Can India strike Chinese main land with as much damage that Chinese can inflict on India?

The fourth question is formidable Chinese production units that can churn the required military wares in numbers in the event of war. Not just this, Chinese forces have been using and upgrading their indigenous equipment. On the other hand, Indian Armed forces, especially the Indian Army does not have such foresight and leadership for almost past 3 decades. India will have to import, non-suited equipment from overseas. This was demonstrated during kargil war.
The fifth question is that Chinese can use nuclear weapons first and Chinese have the capability to withstand a nuclear strike and counter strike. Can India boast of such capabilities against the Chinese main land?

The sixth question is that India and China has undefined borders and Tawang is hotly contested. Will India fight the border war on the Indian side of the territory or the territory occupied by the Chinese?

The eighth question is the maturity of Chinese cyber warfare. We have allegedly seen them hacking Indian embassy PC’s. Have Indian cyber warfare team ever tested hacking Chinese networks?

The ninth question is that Chinese trade flows via Indian Ocean. The Chinese are building Navy to operate in Indian Ocean. Will Indian Navy operate on east Chinese sea?

The tenth reason is the Chinese diplomatic influence and they are a permanent 5 nation at UN. They can block any deal in UN, which concerns them. India does not. Can India walk out of UN, when Chinese have an upper hand there?

The eleventh question is the Chinese ASAT test. China has tested its anti-satellite weapon India has not. Will India be able to destroy Chinese assets in space?

The twelfth question is the Chinese economy and economic influence. Chinese economy can sustain a long war with India. Can Indian economy sustain it? Chinese economic power spans from Latin America to Africa. Even USA and Russia have Chinese as major trading partner. How much can India influence?

The final question is Does India fully understands the Chinese threat.

Strategic importance of Sethusamudram project

"India never lost her independence till she lost the command of the sea in the first decade of the 16th Century". ---Kavalam Pannikar the architect of India's naval doctrine

Maritime power represents military, political, and economic power, exerted through an ability to use the sea or deny its use to others. It has traditionally been employed to control "use-of-the-sea" activities undertaken by nations for their general economic welfare and, often, even for their very survival. Maritime power and naval power are not synonymous, the latter being a sub-set of the former. Traditional land powers are more and more focusing on developing their maritime capabilities to safeguard their economic interests and extend their sphere of influence.

India's fractious polity continues to limit its economic and military potential. Nor have been able to lend a strategic purpose to India’s foreign and economic policies.

1. Now a days there is a lot of fuss around Sethusamudram project. Lot of protests but the government is hellbent to finish it why?


2. India is now conducting naval excersise in Bay of Bengal regularly with US, Japan etc despite the protests from it ally Left front why?

To know the answers please read below.

The background

Asia’s two raising powers India and China are driving the economic, political and military strategies of various nations across the globe. Contrast to Chinese strategy India’s strategy is a reactive. Both countries have enormous energy demands. China a proactive nation, diversified its sources of energy from Asia, Africa, Latin America, China has got an energy security policy in place much longer than India. Competition for finding new energy resources is increasing between these two nations. China has found itself increasingly dependent on resources and markets accessible only via maritime routes. To safeguard its trade routes and flow of resources in a world in which the United States is the dominant naval power, ensuring a continuous supply of energy is most important prerequisite for China in building an advanced, industrialized state. 85 percent of China's trade is sea-based that passes through Indian Ocean. Also, with its 26 shipyards, China has emerged as the world's fourth largest shipbuilder. All the oil supplies to Southeast and East Asia that originate in the Middle East are shipped from ports in the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf. The sea-lanes from here converge in the Arabian Sea and then pass through the Gulf of Mannar and curve off the western, southern and southeastern coast of Sri Lanka.

Taking advantage of a sharp downturn in India's relations with Bangladesh over issues ranging from illegal immigration to Islamist terrorism, transit and trade, Beijing has upgraded its ties with Dhaka to gain naval access to the Chittagong port, to establish a road link with Bangladesh via Myanmar and to acquire Dhaka's immense natural gas reserves. China is already the largest supplier of weaponry to Bangladesh. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's offer to provide Dhaka with nuclear reactor technology has led to speculation as to whether Beijing would replicate in Bangladesh the sort of military, nuclear and missile collaboration it has with Pakistan. Bangladesh and Nepal are also expected to join Pakistan in concluding peace and friendship treaties with China in the near future. Apparently, while India has been preoccupied with fighting cross-border terrorism on its own territory-courtesy China (through Nepali Maoists and their Indian connection Naxalites. China is the main source of weapons to Maoists and the Talibans) and Pakistan, China has been busy making significant inroads into India's backyard through cross-border economic and strategic penetration of Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. China's support for India's smaller neighbours suggests that gaining access to markets and natural resources is not the only reason behind Beijing's South Asia policy: Beijing also wants to make a point on the limits of Indian power. After Myanmar and Bangladesh, to complete the "arc of influence" that would contain India in South Asia, China is determined to enhance military and economic cooperation with the Maldives and Sri Lanka. China's ambition to build a naval base at Marao in the Maldives, its recent entry into the oil exploration business in Sri Lanka, the development of port and bunker facilities at Hambantota, the strengthening military cooperation and boosting bilateral trade with Colombo, are all against Indian interests and ambitions in the region.

Although China claims that its bases are only for securing energy supplies to feed its growing economy, the Chinese base in the Maldives is motivated by Beijing's determination to contain and encircle India and thereby limit the growing influence of the Indian Navy in the region. The Marao base deal was finalized after two years of negotiations, when Chinese Prime minister Zhu Rongzi visited Male' in May 2001. Once Marao comes up as the new Chinese "pearl", Beijing's power projection in the Indian Ocean would be augmented.

Recently, Sri Lanka allocated an exploration block in the Mannar Basin to China for petroleum exploration. This allocation would connote a Chinese presence just a few miles from India's southern tip, thus causing strategic discomfort. In economic terms, it could also mean the end of the monopoly held by Indian oil companies in this realm, putting them into direct and stiff competition from Chinese oil companies. At Hambantota, on the southern coast of Sri Lanka Beijing is building bunkering facilities and oil tank farm. This infrastructure will help service hundreds of ships that traverse the sea lanes of commerce off Sri Lanka. The Chinese presence in Hambantota would be another vital element in its strategic circle already enhanced through its projects in Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

It is Sri Lanka's strategic location that has prompted Beijing to aim for a strategic relationship with Colombo. Beijing is concerned about the growing United States presence in the region as well as about increasing Indo-U.S. naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean. China looks at using the partnership with Sri Lanka to enhance its influence over strategic sea lanes of communication from Europe to East Asia and oil tanker routes from the Middle East to the Malacca Straits. China has been consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean through the Karakoram Highway and Karachi, through the China-Burma road to Burmese ports and through the Malacca Straits, especially once they have established their supremacy over the South China Sea.

As a rising maritime trading power, Beijing is also seeking to once again project force into the Indian Ocean in the manner of the fleets sent out under the command of Admiral Zheng nearly 600 years ago during the Ming dynasty.

With China's growing naval expansion in the Indian Ocean the ever reactive New Delhi, much like China, has increased its military engagement in the region. India now conducts naval and military exercises with the United States, Japan which is opposed by left parties who has got Chinese affliation. India has signed a defense agreement with Singapore and has cooperative arrangements with many nations stretching from the Seychelles to Vietnam. It has participated in mechanisms to protect maritime traffic passing through the strategic Malacca Straits. After the success of its tsunami diplomacy, India is looking forward to evolve new channels of naval diplomacy with the countries in Indian Ocean.

India's geographical location at the natural junction of the busy international shipping lanes that crisscross the Indian Ocean has had a major impact upon the formulation of it's maritime strategy. The sea area around India is among the busiest in the world, with over 100,000 ships transiting the shipping lanes every year. The Straits of Malacca alone account for some 60,000 ships annually. India itself has a 4,670-mile long (7,516 km) coastline and several far-flung island territories. The 13 major and 185 minor ports that mark India's coastline constitute the landward ends of the country's sea lines of communication. The development of additional ports is a high-priority activity and is taking place all along the western and eastern seaboards of the country. India, today, has a modest, but rapidly-growing merchant-shipping fleet, presently comprising 756 ships and totaling 8.6 million "Gross Registered Tonnes," with an average age of around 17 years, as compared to the global average of 20 years. The Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard are major stabilizing forces in the movement of energy across the Indian Ocean, not just for India, but for the world at large.

Sethusamudram Project

To limit Sri Lankan advantage to China and to gain a firm grip on one of the world's most strategic and busiest sea-lanes India started “The Sethusamudram Project”.

Ships from the east coast of India to the west coast have to circumnavigate Sri Lanka. This is because of a Sand Stone Reef called Rama Setu or Adam's bridge, at Pamban, near Rameswaram, where the depth of the sea is hardly 11 feet. After the canal is constructed, the distance between Cape Comorin and Chennai would be reduced to 402 nautical miles from the present 755. Further, the canal would considerably reduce the distance between the east and the west coasts with travelling time coming down by 36 hours. It will also avoid circumnavigation of ships around Sri Lanka, thereby resulting in savings in fuel costs and standing charges associated with extra period of voyages. The canal would help make coastal shipping operations from the east coast to the west coast and vice-versa more competitive. The greatest beneficiary of the project would be Tuticorin harbour in Tamilnadu or Vizhinjam port of Kerala, with a potential to transform into a trans-shipment hub such as those in Singapore and Colombo. Vizhinjam port in Kerala is a natural harbour where as Tuticorin port has to dredge. Regional politics would also come into play ahead of National interest.

On the otherside, the project is put up with stiff opposition from fishermen and environmentalists, followers of Hindu faith and some political parties who have raising their voices against it for different reasons.

The entire coastal belt of Tamilnadu around the project area is dependent on fishing. Therefore the fishermen fear loss of their livelihood.

Environmentalists demand several studies such as baseline studies covering three seasons, environmental management Plan, assessing the impact due to dredging and dumping with specific reference to the dumping areas, impact during operation of the canal, impact of oil spill, etc to ensure that proper management plans are drawn to protect sea life, valuable coral reefs and the livelihood of fishermen.

Followers of Hindu faith believe that Ram Setu or Adam’s bridge has got association with Ramayana hence it should be protected.

Other political parties who are wary that DMK would benefit from this project argue that without addressing the concerns raised by environmentalists and fishermen TR Balu the DMK union minister from TamilNadu acted in haste to gain political mileage.

Related readings:

1. Sethusamudram project: Rama Setu not to be damaged, says SC
2. Sethusamdram canal project
3. China's Strategy of Containing India
4. Bay of Bengal naval exercises are a part of India relearning the art of balance of power
5. It is deplorable that the Left gives comfort to India’s foes
6. Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar
   

Rama setu captured from a Plane

I had come across the following vedio clips on youtube. I would post an item on Setusamdram project shortly. Watch this space. Until then enjoy the clips

Another vedio