The Kashmir conflict, a persistent source of tension between India and Pakistan since their 1947 partition, is a complex dispute rooted in historical, political, and cultural dynamics. Pakistan’s claim to Jammu and Kashmir, grounded in the two-nation theory, has been challenged by India, complicated by the role of British officers in the 1947 conflict, and further highlighted by recent geopolitical developments, including Pakistan’s calls for third-party mediation and U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s uninformed offers to mediate. The centuries-long persecution of Kashmiri Pandits and the actions of British officer Major William Alexander Brown in handing Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan underscore the flaws in Pakistan’s claim and its lack of locus standi. A 2017 British Parliament resolution reaffirming Gilgit-Baltistan as part of India further complicates Pakistan’s position. This article examines these elements and their implications for resolving the Kashmir issue.
Historical Persecution of Kashmiri Pandits
The Kashmiri Pandits, a Hindu Brahmin community native to the Kashmir Valley, have faced persecution since the 14th century, when Islam became dominant in the region. Under Sultan Sikandar (1389–1413), known as “Sikandar Butshikan” (iconoclast), policies of forced conversions, temple destruction, and heavy taxation (jizya) triggered the first major exodus of Pandits to regions like Jammu and Himachal Pradesh (Frykenberg, 1993). Chronicles like Kalhana’s Rajatarangini and Baharistan-i-Shahi document these events, noting significant population declines due to conversions or migration.
Mughal and Afghan rule (16th–18th centuries) brought further challenges. While emperors like Akbar fostered tolerance, Aurangzeb’s reign (1658–1707) imposed discriminatory taxes and restrictions on Hindu practices. Afghan Durrani governors (1753–1819) enforced forced conversions and violence, prompting additional migrations (Zutshi, 2003). Despite periods of syncretism under rulers like Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin (1420–1470), the Pandit community’s numbers dwindled, setting a precedent for their vulnerability under Muslim-majority rule.
The modern era saw the most devastating persecution during the 1989–1990 insurgency. Pakistan-backed militant groups, including Hizbul Mujahideen and Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, targeted Pandits with killings, abductions, and threats like “Raliv, Tsaliv, ya Galiv” (convert, leave, or die). An estimated 100,000–400,000 Pandits fled the Valley, reducing their presence to a few thousand (Government of India, 1991). Indian authorities and Pandit organizations label this ethnic cleansing, a charge supported by human rights reports (Human Rights Watch, 1993).
British Complicity in Gilgit-Baltistan’s Loss
The 1947 partition of British India set the stage for the Kashmir conflict, with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, ruled by Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, becoming a focal point. While the two-nation theory underpinned Pakistan’s claim to the Muslim-majority region, the actions of British officer Major William Alexander Brown significantly shaped the fate of Gilgit-Baltistan, a key part of the princely state.
In 1935, the British leased the Gilgit Agency from the Maharaja to secure its strategic location against Russian influence during the Great Game. The region was guarded by the British-controlled Gilgit Scouts. On August 1, 1947, with independence imminent, the British terminated the lease, returning Gilgit to the Maharaja, who appointed Brigadier Ghansar Singh as governor. However, Major Brown, along with Captain A.S. Mathieson, was loaned to the Maharaja to oversee the region’s defence (Indian Express, 2016).
Following the Maharaja’s signing of the Instrument of Accession to India on October 26, 1947, Major Brown, acting against his mandate, led a revolt. On October 31, he imprisoned Brigadier Ghansar Singh, raised the Pakistani flag, and declared Gilgit’s allegiance to Pakistan, informing British authorities in Peshawar (ORF, 2024). By November 16, Pakistan appointed Sardar Mohammed Alam as its political agent, consolidating control over Gilgit-Baltistan (ORF, 2024). Brown’s actions, supported by British indifference—evidenced by his later receipt of the Most Exalted Order of the British Empire—enabled Pakistan to seize the region without legal basis, as the Maharaja’s accession legally integrated all of Jammu and Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan, into India (Indian Express, 2016).
British Parliament’s 2017 Resolution
In March 2017, the British Parliament passed a motion, sponsored by Conservative MP Bob Blackman, condemning Pakistan’s plan to declare Gilgit-Baltistan its fifth province. The motion stated, “Gilgit-Baltistan is a legal and constitutional part of the state of Jammu & Kashmir, India, which is illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947, and where people are denied their fundamental rights including the right of freedom of expression” (India Today, 2017). It accused Pakistan of altering the region’s demography and criticized the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as an illegal interference in disputed territory. This resolution, while symbolic, reaffirmed India’s legal claim to Gilgit-Baltistan, highlighting Pakistan’s lack of legitimate authority over the region.
Pakistan’s Claim and Lack of Locus Standi
Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan, rests on the two-nation theory, which posits that Muslims and Hindus require separate states, aligning the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with Pakistan. This claim emerged during the 1947 partition, when Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession to India was contested by Pakistan, citing the region’s demographics (Schofield, 2003). However, several factors undermine Pakistan’s locus standi:
Historical Persecution: The centuries-long marginalization of Pandits under Muslim rulers, from Sikandar to Afghan governors, demonstrates a pattern of religious intolerance, contradicting Pakistan’s narrative of protecting Kashmiri rights. The 1990s ethnic cleansing, linked to Pakistan-backed militancy, further erodes its moral standing (Swami, 2007).
British Complicity in 1947: Major Brown’s unauthorized actions in Gilgit-Baltistan, facilitated by British inaction, handed Pakistan control of a region legally acceded to India. This undermines Pakistan’s claim, as it was acquired through treachery, not legitimate means (ORF, 2024).
Legal Standing: The Instrument of Accession (1947) legally integrated Jammu and Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan, into India. The British Parliament’s 2017 resolution reinforces this, declaring Pakistan’s control illegal (India Today, 2017).
Diverse Aspirations: Kashmir’s population includes Sikhs, Buddhists, and Shia Muslims, with many seeking independence or autonomy, not alignment with Pakistan. The two-nation theory oversimplifies this diversity, ignoring minority rights and historical grievances (Bose, 2003).
Pakistan’s claim thus lacks legal and moral legitimacy, rooted in a simplistic religious narrative and enabled by historical British complicity.
Pakistan’s Push for Third-Party Mediation
Pakistan has long sought international mediation to “internationalize” the Kashmir issue, viewing it as a counter to India’s bilateral stance. Following a deadly attack on April 22, 2025, in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed 26 civilians, mostly Hindu tourists, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” striking alleged terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Times of India, 2025). Pakistan denied involvement and responded with drone and missile strikes, escalating tensions (Al Jazeera, 2025).
On May 10, 2025, a ceasefire was announced, with Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry welcoming U.S. involvement and thanking President Trump for offering mediation, describing Kashmir as a “longstanding issue with serious implications for peace and security” (Hindustan Times, 2025). Pakistan reiterated its call for a resolution based on UN resolutions, emphasizing Kashmiri self-determination (Hindustan Times, 2025). This aligns with Pakistan’s historical strategy of seeking external intervention, as seen in appeals to the UN and allies like the UAE (Lowy Institute, 2025).
Trump’s Eagerness and Historical Oversight
President Donald J. Trump, as the 47th U.S. President, quickly offered to mediate, claiming credit for the May 2025 ceasefire and describing the Kashmir dispute as a “thousand-year-old” conflict (Al Jazeera, 2025). In posts on Truth Social, Trump suggested leveraging trade deals to pressure India and Pakistan, claiming he threatened to cancel agreements unless hostilities ceased (India Today, 2025). His statements, however, overlook critical historical context:
Pandit Persecution: Trump’s narrative ignores the centuries-long persecution of Pandits and the 1990s ethnic cleansing linked to Pakistan-backed militancy, undermining Pakistan’s credibility as a stakeholder (Bose, 2003).
British Role in 1947: Trump’s failure to acknowledge Major Brown’s role in ceding Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan glosses over the historical complexities that shaped the dispute (Indian Express, 2016).
India’s Stance: India rejects third-party mediation, citing the Simla Agreement (1972), which mandates bilateral resolution. Indian officials clarified that the 2025 ceasefire resulted from direct military talks, not U.S. mediation (Times of India, 2025).
India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Prime Minister Narendra Modi rebuffed Trump’s offers, emphasizing that the only issue for discussion is the return of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), including Gilgit-Baltistan, and action against terrorism (India Today, 2025). Indian opposition leaders criticized Trump’s historical inaccuracies, noting the conflict began in 1947, not “a thousand years” ago (Hindustan Times, 2025).
Implications for U.S. Policy and Kashmir’s Future
Trump’s mediation push, welcomed by Pakistan but rejected by India, risks straining U.S.-India relations, a critical partnership given India’s $130 billion trade with the U.S. in 2024 (BBC, 2025). India’s opposition to external interference, reinforced by the British Parliament’s 2017 resolution affirming Gilgit-Baltistan as part of India, underscores Pakistan’s lack of legitimate claim (India Today, 2017). The historical role of Major Brown and the persecution of Pandits highlight the need for a resolution that prioritizes minority rights and bilateral dialogue, as mandated by the Simla Agreement. Efforts to rehabilitate displaced Pandits remain unresolved, with only a few thousand returning to the Valley (Government of India, 2020).
Conclusion
Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir, rooted in the two-nation theory, is undermined by its lack of locus standi, given the historical persecution of Kashmiri Pandits, British complicity through Major Brown’s actions in Gilgit-Baltistan, and the British Parliament’s 2017 resolution affirming the region as part of India. Pakistan’s push for third-party mediation, embraced by Trump’s uninformed offers, ignores these complexities and India’s bilateral stance. For peace to prevail, any resolution must address the rights of all Kashmiris, including the displaced Pandits, through direct talks, not external interference.
References
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Frykenberg, R. E. (1993). “The Emergence of Modern Hinduism.” In Hinduism Reconsidered (pp. 82–107). Manohar Publishers.
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Government of India. (2020). Annual Report on Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Migrants. Ministry of Home Affairs.
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Hindustan Times. (2025, May 11). ‘Educate Donald Trump’: Congress MP’s curt remark over US President’s Kashmir mediation offer.
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India Today. (2025, July 8). Donald Trump repeats claim on India-Pak conflict: Cancel all deals, they are at war.
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